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POSSESSION VERSUS USE: RECONCILING THE LETTER AND
THE SPIRIT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION UNDER RULE
10b-5
INTRODUCTION
I talked to Tom last night after I left you some messages and
he and Lou discovered that there was about a million and a
half dollar mistake in the budget, so now we're back at
ground zero and we've got to scramble for the next few
days. Anyway, finally I sold all my stock off on Friday and
I'm going to short the stock because I know it's going to go
down a couple of points in the next week as soon as Lou re-
leases the information about next year's earnings.'
The elusive smoking gun. In this excerpt from a voice mail message, a
corporate insider, here a vice president of the corporation, provides clear
evidence of causation between his possession of inside information and the
sale of stock. However this causal link is not always so clear and can be dif-
ficult to establish.
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and com-
mentators have raised concerns that demonstrating the causal link between
the possession of inside information and its use may be difficult,2 the Ninth
Circuit has recently endorsed a causation standard requiring proof of actual
use of inside information for a violation of Rule 10b-5.3 The question re-
mains, however, whether requiring a more strict standard of proof comports
with the underlying statute used to combat insider trading, Section 10(b),4 or
with the theoretical underpinnings of insider trading regulation.
1. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
2. See id. at 1069 (acknowledging the SEC's concern with the difficulty of establishing
actual use but holding that the government must prove, at a minimum, that the insider used
the information in formulating or consumating his trade); see also ALAN BROMBERG AND
LEWIS LOWENFELs, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 7.4(622), at 7:160.15 (2d ed. 1985) (identifying difficulty of proof as motivating the
SEC's shift to a possession standard); LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 786 (3d ed. 1995) (finding that difficulty of establishing actual use
points to possession as the test).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997). See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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Part I of this comment briefly outlines the prohibition of insider trading
according to Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Securities and Exchange Rule lOb-5, and describes the judicial interpre-
tation of these securities acts in insider trading enforcement. Part II outlines
the competing arguments for a causation requirement in insider trading en-
forcement, tracing the varied judicial treatment of a causation element in
three insider trading cases recently decided by the courts of appeal. Part Im
considers the causation dispute in light of the origins and development of
Section 10(b). Part IV describes the theoretical underpinnings of insider
trading regulation and considers whether the current judicial treatment of
causation is in accord with these considerations.
I. THE PROHIBITION ON INSIDER TRADING: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE RULE lOb-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19345 and Securi-
ties and Exchange Rule lOb-56 prohibit insiders from trading on the basis of
material, non-public information. Section 10(b) serves as the SEC's princi-
ple weapon against insider trading.! The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 as an
anti-fraud provision to implement Section 10(b).'
Rule lOb-5 has been interpreted as having five distinct elements.9 First,
there must be use of the required juridictional means in connection with the
conduct.'" Second, there must be a misrepresentation or omission." Third,
the misrepresentation or omission must be material. 2 Fourth, the conduct
5. Under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, it is illegal to "use or em-
ploy, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national security
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contriv-
ance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1994).
6. The Securities and Exchange Commission created Rule 10b-5 to implement section
10(b). According to Rule lOb-5,
it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, (a) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1997).
7. See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 5.1, at 281 (1996).
8. See id.
9. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 7, § 4.1, at 122.
10. See id. § 4.1, at 122 n.2 (including use of national securities markets or other instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce).
11. See id. § 4.1, at 122.
12. See id. A statement is material if a reasonable investor would have considered the
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must be in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. '3Finally, the
defendant must have acted with scienter.'4
There are two theories of liability for insider trading under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. Under the traditional theory, a violation of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 occurs when a corporate insider trades in his or her corporate
stock on the basis of material or confidential information obtained by reason
of his or her position. 5 Under the misappropriation theory, a corporate out-
sider violates Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he or she misappropriates
confidential information to make a securities transaction, breaching a fi-
duiciary duty owed to the source of the information. '"
II. USE VERSUS POSSESSION: COMPETING ARGUMENTS FOR A CAUSATION
REQUIREMENT
The two competing arguments concerning a causation requirement are
requiring proof of actual use of inside information as a basis for a trade, and
alternatively, trading while in knowing possession of material, non-public
information."
A. The Possession Standard
The possession standard is based on the idea that inside information
does not just sit idle in the mind of a corporate insider.'" Under a possession
standard, causation is established when an insider is in possession of inside
information and later trades. 9 Proponents of the possession standard point to
the language of both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, standards handed down
by the United States Supreme Court, and to the difficulties of proof associ-
ated with the "actual use" test. 0 This standard allows for a broader enforce-
ment scheme and thus is promoted by the SEC.2' The possession standard
information, if it had been disclosed, important in making the investment decision. Id. n.4.
13. See id. § 4.1, at 122.
14. See id. Scienter is the mental state embracing the intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
15. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980) (holding that a financial
printer did not violate § 10(b) where he was under no duty to disclose material, non-public
information to selling shareholders).
16. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2202 (1997) (finding an attorney li-
able under § 10(b) for misappropriating information gained from a client who was a takeover
target, and using that information to make stock trades).
17. See Allan Horwich, Possession v. Use: Is There a Causation Element in the Prohibi-
tion on Insider Trading?, 52 Bus. LAW. 1235, 1267 (1997).
18. See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993).
19. See id. (pointing to a number of factors that support a knowing possession standard).
20. See id.
21. See Horwich, supra note 17, at 1264. "It is apparent from the preceding history of
legislative proposals for defining insider trading that the current SEC position is that trading
while in possession of inside information is a violation of rule lOb-5." Id.
1999]
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most notably has seen support in the decision of United States v. Teicher,
where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit endorsed the "knowing"
possession standard of causation in the context of a criminal prosecution for
insider trading.22
In United States v. Teicher, two individuals involved in arbitrage and
an investment firm appealed convictions of securities fraud prosecuted under
Rule 10b-5.' The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions of the arbitra-
geurs, and in doing so, endorsed the possession standard for causation in
dicta2
Teicher and the other defendants in this case were arbitrageurs involved
in the trading of stock in corporations that were takeover targets.26 The arbi-
tragers were receiving lists of companies that were potential takeover targets
from an analyst at an investment banking firm.27 The arbitrageurs made nu-
merous trades and accompanying profits on the basis of the confidential in-
formation provided by the analysts.28
At trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the insider trading counts.29
Teicher appealed on the issue of an allegedly improper jury instruction as to
the proof of a causal link between the misappropriated information and the
trades. Teicher alleged that the jury instruction allowed the jury to find the
defendants guilty of securities fraud based upon the mere possession of
fraudulently obtained material, non-public information without its actual
use.
3 1
In discussing the causation argument, the court focused on the factors
that point to adopting a "knowing possession" standard as promulgated by
the SEC.32 According to the court, the first factor that pointed to the posses-
sion standard was the language of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.33 These
rules require a deceptive practice "in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security." The court found this language to be consonant with the posses-
sion standard rather than requiring proof of a causal connection by use.35
22. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
23. "Arbitrage entails trading in securities in companies that are the subject of changes in
corporate control in order to take advantage of fluctuations in the price of these securities." Id.
at 114.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 120-21.
26. See id. at 115.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 114-15.
29. See id. at 114.
30. See id. at 118.
31. See id. at 119.
32. See id. (finding that the SEC has consistently endorsed a standard of "knowing pos-
session"). But see SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating the SEC has
not adopted a consistent opinion on use versus possession over the years).
33. See Teicher, 987 F.2d at 120.
34. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1997)).
35. See id.
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Second, the court found the maxim "disclose or abstain" from trading
while in possession of material, non-public information to be in accord with
the possession standard.36 Because the arbitragers held material, non-public
information and were not in a position to make th. information public, the
court stated that they were required to completely abstain from trading.'
Finally, the court relied on the simplicity of the knowing possession
standard in support of its adoption." The court stated that information can
not be held idle on the brain of a trader, and whether or not it was used in a
trade is difficult to prove. 9 This seems to have been persuasive in the court's
adoption of the knowing possession standard.
Acknowledging its support of the knowing possession standard as dicta,
the court found the alleged fault in the jury instruction to be harmless.'
Therefore, the holding did not actually include adopting knowing possession
as the causal standard for insider trading enforcement in the Second Circuit.
B. The Actual Use Standard
The alternative theory of causation, proof of actual use of non-public in-
formation, is a more strict standard of proof for plaintiffs or prosecutors.
Under the "actual use" standard, the plaintiff or prosecutor must show that
the insider actually used the non-public information in question."' While ac-
tual use can be readily shown in most situations, significant difficulties of
proof can arise in trying to examine the state of mind of the trader and the
possible disingenuous excuses for making a trade.4' There is some debate
among commentators as to whether Rule lOb-5 is violated by trading while
in possession of non-public information or whether actual use of the non-
public information must be shown. '3 Even though the Supreme Court has not
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 121.
40. See id.
41. See Horwich, supra note 17, at 1250; see also BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note
2, § 7.4(622), at 7:160.15. Bromberg and Lowenfels state that an inference of use from trad-
ing while in possession of material, non-public information is commonly drawn from the
trading pattern, including timing, size, and type of stock transaction. See id. In SEC v. Adler,
the court endorsed a rebuttable evidentiary presumption of use from possession, which may
significantly ease the burden of showing actual use. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1340; see also
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging, but not adopt-
ing, the evidentiary presumption as a method of alleviating the difficulty of establishing actual
use).
42. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998).
43. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 786
(3d ed. 1995) (concluding that the possession standard should be used because of difficulties
of proof); BROMBERG & LOWENEELS, supra note 2, § 7.4(610), at 7:160.1 (concluding that
nonuse of material, non-public information can be used as an affirmative defense, and posses-
sion rather than use probably suffices for a prima facie case of 10-b5 insider trading).
1999]
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squarely addressed this issue, support for the actual use standard can be in-
ferred from dicta in some insider trading cases decided by the Court." The
issue is actually rarely addressed by the courts directly, '5 and there is often a
"smoking gun" to prove causation conclusively.' However, two recent court
of appeals decisions have endorsed an actual use standard.'7 In SEC v. Adler,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that the SEC must prove
actual use of insider information, but permitted a rebuttable evidentiary pre-
sumption of use from possession of inside information while making a stock
trade."
In Adler, the SEC brought a civil suit against two former corporate in-
siders and two business associates for insider trading violations under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5.9
The prohibited transactions were committed in various transactions in 1989
and 1992.5" The defendants claimed that the transactions were part of a
planned series of transactions, and not on the basis of any inside informa-
tion."
The SEC argued that the knowing possession standard should have been
employed. 2 In support of this contention, the SEC cited to the familiar
maxim "disclose or abstain,"'53 which according to the SEC, dictates the
trader must either disclose the material, non-public information or abstain
from trading while in possession.' The court found the disclose or abstain
maxim supported the actual use standard.'
The court in Adler also looked to Dirks v. SEC5 for support of the actual
use standard. In the Dirks opinion, the Supreme Court found that the inside
tipper must gain some personal advantage from the inside information for
44. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. The Supreme Court has indicated that "§10(b) and
rule lOb-5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on
the basis of material, non-public information." Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1993). In
dicta, the Court stated "a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate 'use of inside infor-
mation for personal advantage."' Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
n.15 (1961)).
45. See Horwich, supra note 17, at 1245.
46. See id. at 1270.
47. See Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998); Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir.
1998).
48. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1340.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 1327-28, 1330-31.
51. See id. at 1339, 1342.
52. See id. at 1333.
53. See id. at 1338 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961)).
54. See id. at 1338.
55. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1333-34 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-28; Dirks, 463 U.S.
at 659-60 (stating that the insider's duty is to not take advantage of the information by trading
without disclosure)).
56. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1332 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662).
[Vol. 35
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the outside tippee to be liable for insider trading.' The Adler court found this
language to support an actual use standard. 8 Additional support was gleaned
from United States v. O'Hagan9 In O'Hagan, the Supreme Court defined
insider trading as when "a corporate insider trades in the securities of his
corporation on the basis of material, non-public information."'6 Although
stated in dicta, the Adler court found this to be consonant with the actual use
standard."'
Adler also addressed the SEC's position on the use versus possession is-
sue." The court determined that the SEC had not adopted a consistent stance
on this issue over the years.63 Since the SEC had changed its opinion on the
appropriate standard, the court placed little emphasis on the SEC's current
position on use versus possession.'
Next, the court examined congressional treatment of the use versus pos-
session argument. Looking to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,'
the court determined that Congress deliberately chose the language "in pos-
session" in the statute." However, the court found that this choice of words
was not determinative because the Insider Trading Sanctions Act was de-
signed to address remedies for insider trading, and the legislative history ex-
plicitly stated that the act was not to supersede the case law on the subject.'
Consequently, the court gave little weight to the legislative treatment of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act.6
The court ultimately found the actual use standard to be the appropriate
standard,69 concluding that a jury could have reasonably found that the insid-
ers in question used the information in connection with the sale of stock.
However, establishment of a causal relationship was aided by the court's
adoption of an inference of use from possession." The court announced that
"proof of an insider's possession of material non-public information at the
time of the trade gives rise to a strong inference of use." ' This inference al-
lowed by the court may be rebutted with evidence of a pre-existing plan or
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1334.
59. See id. (citing O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642).
60. Id.
61. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1334.
62. See id. at 1336.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5, 98 Stat. 1264, 1265
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (d) (1994)).
66. See Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336.
67. See id. at 1337.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1340.
70. See id. at 1342.
71. See id. at 1340.
72. Id.
1999]
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other innocent explanations.73 The existence of an inference of use from pos-
session may answer the SEC's concern about the difficulties of proof and
weakened enforcement authority.74 The inference of use from possession was
acknowledged but not specifically adopted in United States v. Smith, another
recent circuit court of appeals case that endorsed the actual use test.75
In Smith, the defendant, Richard Smith, was the vice president of PDA
Engineering (PDA), a publicly traded firm on the National Association of
Securities Dealers Exchange (NASDAQ)." Smith held over 50,000 shares of
stock in PDA. Between June 10 and June 18, 1993, Smith sold all of his
shares in PDA." In July of 1993, Smith sold short7 25,000 shares of PDA
stock.79
On June 19, Smith left voicemail messages with a co-worker indicating
that Smith had possession of inside information." After a another co-worker
obtained the voicemail and reported the suspect transactions to the U.S. At-
torney, Smith was indicted for insider trading." Specifically, Smith was in-
dicted for eleven counts of insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5, and obstruction of jus-
tice." A jury convicted Smith on all eleven counts of insider trading."
Among the issues raised by Smith on appeal was the district court's jury in-
struction regarding Smith's state of mind.' The jury instruction was disputed
because it left some uncertainty as to whether Smith could be found guilty of
insider trading by merely trading while in possession of inside information.'
73. See id. at 1337.
74. See Tower L. Snow, Jr. et al., The Return of Insider Trading and Related Develop-
,nents Under Rule l0b-5, in THE ART OF COUNSELING DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND INSIDERS:
How, WHEN AND WHAT TO DISCLOSE? 131, 146 (1998).
75. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1053.
78. Short selling refers to the practice of investors who speculate by selling stock they do
not own, in hopes that the price will decline and the investor will then cover by buying shares
at the new, lower price. See ARNOLD JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5,
§ 38.02, at 54 n.51.7 (1996) (citing Nick v. Shearson/Am. Express, 612 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.
Minn. 1984)).
79. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1053.
80. The message in pertinent part said, "I talked to Tom last night after I left you some
messages and he and Lou discovered that there was about a million and a half dollar mistake
in the budget, so now we're back at ground zero and we've got to scramble for the next few
days. Anyway, finally I sold all my stock off on Friday and I'm going to short the stock be-
cause I know its going to go down a couple of points in the next week as soon as Lou releases
the information about next year's earnings. I'm more concerned about this year's earnings
actually." id. at 1053.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1054.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. The pertinent portion of the jury instruction at issue was: "However, the government
need not prove that the defendant sold or sold short PDA stock solely because of the material
non public information. It is enough if the government proves that such inside information
[Vol. 35
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The government and the SEC contended that there should be no proof of
actual use causation required in a lOb-5 insider trading prosecution. Both
parties argued that when a corporate insider like Smith has information re-
lating to his company that he knows (or is reckless in not knowing) to be
material and non-public, and he trades in the company's stock, he violates
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whether or not the in-
formation is a factor in his decision to trade.
86
The court settled on the actual use requirement after examining the Su-
preme Court's treatment of the issue in dictum and courts of appeals' deci-
sions that had addressed the issue of use versus possession.
First, the court examined the arguable proposition that the Supreme
Court has supported an actual use causation requirement in Rule lOb-5. In
dicta, the Supreme Court has stated that under the "traditional" or "classical
theory" of insider trading liability, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are violated
when a corporate insider trades on the basis of material, non-public informa-
tion. 7 This language was interpreted by the court as pointing to the actual
use standard. The Smith court paid further deference to the Supreme Court's
statement that "the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his prin-
ciple, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities.""8
The Smith court also found that the actual use standard comports with
the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 9 The court found the lan-
guage of the statutes that proscribe the use of manipulative and deceptive
practices in connection with stock transactions to support an actual use re-
quirement." The court reasoned that the requirement of an intent to defraud
dictates that only intentional conduct is prohibited, and therefore the actual
use standard is the more appropriate standard.91
The Smith court put some credence in the claims of the SEC regarding
the difficulty of proving actual use.' However, the court stated that the gov-
ernment could often present definitive evidence of causation through direct
or circumstantial evidence.93 Although acknowledging that proof of the state
of mind of the insider may be difficult to demonstrate, the court made refer-
ence to the possibility of an inference to show use from possession." How-
ever, the court felt it could not adopt any presumption that would shift the
was a significant factor in defendant's decision to sell or sell short PDA stock." Id. at 1065.
86. See id.
87. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
88. Id. at 2209.
89. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
90. See id.
91. See id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23).
92. See id. at 1069.
93. See id.
94. See id.
1999]
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burden of persuasion in a criminal prosecution for insider trading."
III. CAUSATION IN LIGHT OF THE STATUTORY ORIGINS OF
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION: SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
The preceding cases demonstrate a lack of clear consensus in the courts
on the causation issue. Much of the disagreement in interpretation likely
stems from the evolution of Rule lOb-5 as a "catch-all" anti-fraud provi-
sion.96 Examining the underlying statute giving rise to Rule lOb-5 may shed
some light on the appropriate standard of causation.
There is a distinct lack of legislative history on Section 10(b)'s applica-
tion to insider trading, possibly owing to its broad purposesY Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was intended to cover a broad
scope of deceitful practices that Congress was concerned about in 1933 and
1934."8 Section 10(b) expressly prohibits the use, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security, of any manipulative or deceptive device in
contravention of the rules as the commission may prescribe.' In prohibiting
deceptive or manipulative devices, Congress delegated flexible authority to
the SEC to exercise rule-making powers."° The SEC used this authority to
promulgate Rule lOb-5 to enforce the provisions of Section 10(b). 1 ' How-
ever, liability under Rule lOb-5 cannot be extended to conduct beyond the
scope of Section 10(b)."
Section 10(b) has been interpreted as requiring scienter, or the intent to
deceive.' 3 This scienter requirement has been interpreted to include only in-
tentional conduct calculated to defraud."I By prohibiting trades while in pos-
session of inside information, the possession standard may penalize innocent
trading activity done in accordance with a predetermined plan with no intent
to deceive." On the other hand, the actual use standard requires the prose-
cution to prove that the inside information was actually used, giving rise to
the requisite intent to defraud."° Therefore, regulation of insider trading
based on actual use may be more in accordance with Section 10(b).
95. See id.
96. See Scott Davis, Liability under Sections 10, 18, and 20 of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 426 (1997).
97. See Richard J. Morgan, The Insider Trading Rules After Chiarella: Are They Consis-
tent with Statutory Policy?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1407, 1409 (1982).
98. See WLIAM H. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 19 (1968).
99. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964)).
100. See id. at 18-19.
101. See id.
102. See id.; see also O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
103. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
104. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23).
105. See id.
106. See id
[Vol. 35380
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IV. CAUSATION IN LIGHT OF THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
Another possible approach to the causation discussion is to examine the
theoretical underpinnings of the prohibition on insider trading as a guide.
The policy considerations underlying the enforcement of insider trading laws
may provide a clearer understanding of the difficult issues presented by in-
sider trading, such as the causation issue.
While there has been some debate among commentators as to the policy
concerns that underlie the prohibition on insider trading," three considera-
tions routinely pointed to as reasons to prohibit insider trading are: (1) Eq-
uity or Fairness, (2) Property Rights, and (3) Efficiency." 3
A. Equity
Consideration of equity or fairness is based on the premise that trading
on an informational advantage by an insider is unfair to other investors."°
When an insider makes a illicit transaction resulting in a profit, this leaves
others worse off, leading to the conclusion that the transaction is unfair."'
There has been judicial support and recognition of this concept in insider
trading cases."' The Supreme Court has disfavored the idea that all inequi-
ties from informational disparity should be prohibited."' However, the SEC
has steadfastly supported the position that anyone in possession of material,
non-public information must either disclose the information or abstain from
trading."3
Further support for the concept of equity underlying the regulation of
insider trading is found in the legislative record. The House Committee on
Energy and Commerce identified equity and informational disparity as im-
107. See Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy,
in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 120, 121-30 (Richard A.
Posner & Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980) (proposing fair play as a concept to guide 10b-5 and
also addressing the informed market and business property as considerations); see also HENRY
MANNE, INsIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (proposing management entrepre-
neurialism and other factors as pointing to not regulating insider trading).
108. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 760-64 (identifying equity, allocative effi-
ciency, and property fights as considerations); Scott, supra note 107, at 121-30 (identifies fair
play, efficiency, and property rights as considerations in regulation of insider trading).
109. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 760.
110. See Scott, supra note 107, at 124.
111. See id. at 121. The rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the secu-
rities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have equal access to
material information. See id. (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968)).
112. See Chiarella 445 U.S. at 232-33 (stating that neither Congress nor the SEC has
adopted a parity of information rule).
113. See, e.g., Smith, 155 F.3d 1051; Teicher, 987 F.2d 112; Adler, 137 F.3d 1325.
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portant considerations in insider trading regulation, noting that "the abuse of
informational advantages that other investors cannot hope to overcome
through their own efforts is unfair and inconsistent with the investing pub-
lic's legitimate expectation of honest and fair securities markets where all
participants play by the same rules."""
The application of the concept of equity to the causation issue brings
clarity to the dispute between mere possession or actual use as the standard
for insider trading enforcement. The material, non-public information held
by an insider does have the possibility of creating an unfair informational
disparity between the insider and other investors."5 Being in possession of
information while making a planned series of trades does not automatically
give rise to a inequitable informational disparity."6 Unfairness is only appar-
ent when an insider actually uses the material, non-public information as the
basis for making the trade."7 According to the court in Smith, "it is the in-
sider's use, not his possession, that gives rise to an informational advan-
tage."" 8 There is further judicial recognition of the legitimacy of informa-
tional disparities in Chiarella v. United States."9 Proof of actual use should
be required in order to make the logical connection that demonstrates the
trade was unfair to other investors by taking advantage of an inequitable in-
formational disparity.
B. Property Rights
Information can be considered an asset." Insider-held corporate infor-
mation is a corporate asset, with time and corporate resources being spent
developing these assets.'' Examples of information assets include patents,
trademarks, financial reports, and business plans." These important seg-
ments of information, therefore, should be considered property and protected
as such.' 3
Using the property theory as a basis for insider trading liability has been
114. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 760 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-355, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1983)). The House Committee on Energy and Commerce wrote this before
adopting the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, which was enacted to provide further
penalties for insider trading. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1068.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 112.
120. See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against hsider Trading, 13 HoFsTRA L. REv. 9, 30 (1984); Richard J. Morgan, Insider
Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIo ST. L. J. 79, 94 (1987).
121. See Morgan, supra note 120, at 95.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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recognized by the Supreme Court.'24 The property theory is based on the
premise of a duty owed to the corporation not to misappropriate informa-
tion.'" By misappropriating material, non-public information owned by the
corporation, the insider is taking the property of the corporation. 6 Insiders
should be prohibited from the misuse of material, non-public corporate in-
formation by a proscription on insider trading.
The property rights underpinning points to a resolution of the causation
dispute in favor of the actual use standard. It is plausible that a corporation
would consent to an insider's possession of inside information.'27 Where the
company has consented to the insider's access to this information as part of
his or her job, there is no illicit use unless the information is used in an un-
consented manner.' The theoretical taking of corporate property only occurs
when the insider actually uses the corporate information without consent. 9
Thus, the property theory of insider trading points to requiring proof of ac-
tual use of information rather than the possession standard.
C. Economic Efficiency
Economic efficiency is another theory underlying the regulation of in-
sider trading sometimes cited by commentators.' On its face, the economic
efficiency argument tends to point to possession of information as the ap-
propriate standard. The cost of capital for a corporation is minimized where
investors buy corporate stock rather than the corporation relying on the debt
markets. 3' The dissemination of material information about a corporation af-
fects the prices of the corporation's securities.' Faster and greater disclosure
of material, non-public information should cause a more efficient allocation
of resources to the most productive firns."'33
Commentators have found that limiting insider trading promotes faster
and greater disclosure of material information."M However, on closer exami-
nation, the practical effects of the possession standard may actually have the
opposite effect on the economic efficiency and the optimization of stock
124. See Macey, supra note 120, at 35.
125. See id. at 47.
126. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2208.
127. See Morgan, supra note 120, at 96.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 761; see also John F. Barry III, The Eco-
nomics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307, 1317-18 (1981);
Scott, supra note 107, at 121-30.
131. See Barry, supra note 130, at 1317-18 (finding that when security prices reflect all
available information, the firm's individual costs of capital decrease because investors are ea-
ger to buy the firm's securities).
132. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 761-62.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 761 (3d ed. 1995); see also Barry, supra note 130, at 1317-18.
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prices.
The possession standard is a more strict standard of enforcement. An in-
crease in regulation on insiders may prove to be a disincentive to manage-
ment ownership of the corporation.'35 Insiders may want to avoid the poten-
tial liability of trading while in possession of information. 36 Corporate
managers who are also owners of the corporation are more likely to act in
accord with shareholder interests, such as maximizing wealth.'37 The rela-
tionship between executive ownership interests and corporate performance
has been found to be positively related.33 The economically efficient shift of
resources to firms with the greatest productivity' 39 may therefore be driven
by an insider trading standard that promotes management ownership. Con-
versely, the possible disincentive to take a larger equity stake in the owner-
ship of the corporation, promulgated by the possession standard, may reduce
a corporation's stock price, thereby not promoting economic efficiency."
Therefore, the actual use standard is preferable to the possession standard
since it more fully comports with the goal of economic efficiency.
While there is no definite consensus as to the policy considerations un-
derlying the regulation of insider trading, 41 or even whether insider trading
should be prohibited,' generally accepted policy considerations provide
some clarity in resolving confusing issues in insider trading. The require-
ment of proof of actual use finds support in the policy concerns of fairness,
protecting corporate property rights, and economic efficiency.
CONCLUSION
The treatment of actual use and possession of material, non-public in-
formation in the courts is hardly of one accord.43 The legislative record on
the actual use versus possession standard is inconclusive.'" Alternatives to
these conflicting interpretations do exist. One alternative would be to legis-
latively define insider trading effectively and enact new laws that resolve the
135. See Steven R. Salbu, Tipper Credibility, Noninformational Tippee Trading, and Ab-
stention From Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the Insider Trading Laws, 68 WASH. L. REV.
307, 344 (1993).
136. Seeid.at341.
137. See id. at 344-45.
138. See Miron Stano, Executive Ownership Interest and Corporate Performance, in
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 38, 38 (Richard A. Posner &
Kenneth E. Scott eds., 1980).
139. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 762.
140. See id.; Salbu, supra note 135, at 344.
141. See supra notes 107, 108.
142. See generally HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
143. See, e.g., Adler, 137 F.3d 1325; Smith 155 F.3d at 1068 (supporting the actual use
standard). But see Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (supporting the knowing possession standard).
144. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 5, 98 Stat. 1264, 1265
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (d) (1994)).
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confusion created by a judicially-implied enforcement scheme. However,
legislatures and the SEC have resisted the enactment of new legislation to
better define insider trading. 5
By examining the statutory origins of the prohibition on insider trading,
and the theoretical underpinnings of the prohibition of insider trading, this
comment provides a alternative analysis of the adoption of an actual use
standard versus a possession standard of causation.
Section 10(b) was enacted to prohibit the use of deceptive devices in
stock transactions."4 Section 10(b) has been interpreted to apply only to in-
tentionally fraudulent conduct. 7 The regulation of insider trading based on a
possession standard may go beyond the statutory prohibition on intentional
fraudulent conduct to potentially innocent transactions. 48 Therefore, regula-
tion of insider trading based on an actual use standard would more closely
parallel the statute that spawned the prohibition.4 9
Next, the policy based underpinnings of the regulation of insider trading
point to actual use as the standard. 5 First, principles of equity are promoted
by requiring proof of actual use of inside information. Congress and the
courts have pointed to equity as an important policy consideration in insider
trading enforcement.' Insider trading calls the notions of equity and fairness
in the stock market into question.5 Yet, principles of equity are only prob-
lematic where the insider actually takes advantage of their informational lev-
erage and trade on the basis of inside information." Thus proof of actual use
should be shown to serve the policy goal of equity.54
Second, the policy goal of protecting property rights is more properly
served by an actual use standard that reflects the nature of material, non-
public information. Material, non-public information can be realistically
viewed as corporate property, subject to theft and other unconsented use. 5'
But where an insider is authorized to possess inside information, there is no
"taking" of corporate property unless she actually uses the information in
making a stock transaction. 6 Therefore, the property rights theory points to
actual use as the standard for causation.)
145. Congress has resisted defining insider trading more clearly, leaving the narrowing
of the definiton to judicial construction. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 7, § 73.3, at 585-
86 n.63 (citing CONG. REC. S. 8912-8913 (June 29, 1984) (remarks of Mr. D'Amato)).
146. See supra Part III.
147. See supra Part III.
148. See supra Part III.
149. See supra Part III for analysis of Section 10(b).
150. See supra Part IV for discussion of policy considerations.
151. See supra Part IV.A.
152. See supra Part IV.A.
153. See supra Part IV.A.
154. See supra Part IV for discussion of policy considerations.
155. See supra Part IV.B.
156. See supra Part IV.B.
157. See id.
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Third, market efficiency may point to an actual use standard for causa-
tion in insider trading enforcement. If corporate insiders are held to a more
strict regulatory standard of possession rather than use, the insiders may seek
to isolate themselves from material, non-public information, or choose not to
invest in their corporattion's stock.'58 This disincentive to take an active role
in the corporation promulgated by the possession standard would not pro-
mote allocative efficiency.'59 Overall, it appears that the actual use standard
is more consonant with the underlying statute and policy-based goals of in-
sider trading enforcement. Bryan C. Smith"
158. See supra Part IV.C.
159. See id.J.D. Candidate 2000, California Western School of Law; B.S. Business Administra-
tion, University of Colorado, 1994. I would like to thank Professor Gloria Sandrino for her
advice in generating the initial topic. I would also like to express my appreciation to my wife,
Jasmine, and the rest of my family for their encouragement and support.
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